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Concepts of Citizenship in France 
During the Long Eighteenth Century
The  French  Revolution  is  commonly  seen  as  the  moment  when  modern 
democracy and citizenship first  appeared on the European stage.  There is 1
undoubtedly some truth in this. Universal male suffrage first appeared in the 
elections to the Convention in 1792 and was then enshrined in the Revolu-
tionary  Constitution  of  1793,  though  the  latter  was  never  implemented. 
Moreover  this  period witnessed detailed discussions  concerning the  rights 
(and duties) of citizens; the extension of political participation to poorer in-
habitants; the rights of black slaves in the colonies; and even whether women 
should be granted the right to vote. The word 'citoyen'  itself was far more 
prevalent by the 1790s than it had been a century earlier. Not only was it cited 
in a number of pamphlets and political documents, but by the middle of the 
decade it had even replaced 'Monsieur' as the common form of greeting. 
   However, these ideas did not emerge out of nowhere. Rather, revolutionary 
theories and practices grew out of eighteenth-century debates and the devel-
oping conceptions of citizenship they engendered. In particular, from the late 
seventeenth century, Bodinian and rights-based conceptions began to vie with 
the more conventional ancient usage and enacted a transformation whereby 
citizenship regained contemporary relevance and importance.   Moreover, it 2
                                                                       
was precisely the tensions within these earlier debates, and in particular the 
ambituities inherent in the rights-based conception, that sparked some of the 
key controversies surrounding citizenship that marked the early years of the 
Revolution.
Ancient Citizenship
Like many European political concepts, ‘citizenship’ (‘citoyenneté’ in French) 
had its origins in the ancient world.  The ancient understanding of the con3 -
cept combined two elements. In the first place, a citizen was an inhabitant of a 
city (both the English ‘citizen’ and the French ‘citoyen’ are derived from the 
Latin civis). However, to be a citizen in the ancient world required more than 
simply living in a particular urban space. Many other groups of people who 
were not classed as citizens lived in ancient Athens, Sparta and Rome – in-
cluding children, women, slaves, and foreign visitors. What therefore distin-
guished the citizens from the other inhabitants of the city-states was that they 
were eligible to participate in the political life of the city. As Aristotle put it: 
'he shares in the administration of justice, and in offices.’  Though Aristotle 4
was keen to make clear that citizenship differed under different forms of gov-
ernment, and that his definition ‘is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy; 
but not necessarily to other states’, it was this definition that endured. 
                                                                       
   According to Charlotte Wells, this ancient concept of citizenship – filtered 
via Italian Renaissance theorists – was already being applied to France in the 
sixteenth century, by figures such as Jean Bacquet and René Choppin.  Al5 -
though it was eclipsed in the seventeenth century, Wells argues that it was re-
vived in the eighteenth century and went on to form the basis of the modern 
concept of citizenship that developed during the Enlightenment.  
   The ancient conception of citizenship was certainly commonplace in France 
during the eighteenth century. However, for the most part, it was presented as 
an historical concept – a feature of the ancient world. Thus many of the refer-
ences to citizenship in the works of eighteenth-century authors (especially in 
the first half of the century) were concerned with the politically active inhabi-
tants of ancient states. Moreover, definitions of the term ‘citoyen’ in dictionar-
ies and works of reference usually included some discussion of Greek or Ro-
man citizens. For example, in the 1702 edition of his Dictionnaire royal, François 
et Anglois, Abel Boyer referred to ‘Les Citoyens de l’ancienne Rome’.  Similarly, 6
in his article ‘Citoyen’ in the Encyclopédie Denis Diderot devoted a consider-
able amount of space to discussing the requirements for citizenship in ancient 
Athens and Rome.7
   It was also this concept of citizenship that was at the heart of Montesquieu’s 
understanding of republican government in De L’Esprit des lois. He famously 
                                                                       
defined republican government as ‘that in which the people as a body, or only a 
part of the people, have sovereign power’.  He then went on to demonstrate that it 8
was a form of government associated with the small city-states of the ancient 
world. The examples to which he referred to illustrate his account were al-
most all from Athens, Sparta or Rome.  Moreover, he insisted that such a sys9 -
tem of government was not compatible with large states or with other circum-
stances of the modern world.10
   Of course, there were certain places within the modern world in which the 
ancient conception of citizenship supposedly still applied. Perhaps the most 
familiar for eighteenth-century French writers was Geneva. In his article on 
Geneva in the Encyclopédie, Jean d’Alembert distinguished four classes of in-
habitants: the citizens, the bourgeois, the residents and the natives. Only the 
first two groups enjoyed any kind of political rights and only the former were 
truly citizens according to Aristotle’s definition of the term:
the citizens who are the sons of bourgeois and were born in the city; 
they alone can become magistrates. The bourgeois who are the sons of 
bourgeois or of citizens but were born in a foreign country, or who are 
foreigners to whom the magistracy has granted the rights of bourgeois, 
which it has the power to do; these can be members of the General 
                                                                       
Council and even of the Grand Conseil, called the “Council of the Two 
Hundred”.11
   Geneva also provided a model for Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s account of citi-
zenship. In Du Contrat social he emphasised both its city-state focus and its 
political component. For Rousseau the crucial role of a citizen was participa-
tion in the making of the laws, and according to him it was the assembled cit-
izen body that was responsible for enacting legislation:
The Sovereign, having no other force than the legislative power, acts 
only by means of the laws, and the laws being nothing but authentic 
acts of the general will, the Sovereign can act only when the people is 
assembled. The people assembled, it will be said! What a chimera! It is 
a chimera today, but it was not so two thousand years ago: Have men 
changed in nature?12
While this requirement that all citizens hold sovereign power and assemble 
regularly in order to exercise that power may seem unrealistically demanding 
from a modern perspective,  Gabriella  Silvesterini  has noted that  even this 
conception of citizenship marked a considerable retreat from Aristotle's pre-
cise understanding. Rousseau did not require citizens to hold public office 
(unless they were living in a democracy). Rather they just had to attend the 
                                                                       
assembly and vote on laws proposed by the legislator or government. Enact-
ing legislation had replaced Aristotle's richer conception of holding public of-
fice, hence Rousseau's claim that all legitimate states were republican, regard-
less of the form of government.13
   Of course, the term ‘citoyen’ also continued to be used in eighteenth-century 
France to refer to the inhabitants of cities that were not city-states – such as 
those within France itself. Thus, Boyer in his dictionary also used 'citizen' as a 
synonym  for  ‘Bourgeois’,  which  he  defined  as  ‘habitant  d’une  Ville’,  and 
alongside ‘Les Citoyens de l’ancienne  Rome’ he also spoke of ‘Les Citoyens de 
Londres’.  Though  this  appellation  probably  did  imply  some  kind  of  in14 -
volvement in the political, economic or cultural life of the city, it clearly also 
represented a dilution of the original ancient meaning of the term.
Bodinian Citizenship
An alternative to the ancient conception of citizenship was available from the 
end of the sixteenth century, courtesy of Jean Bodin.  In his Six livres de la 15
république of 1576, Bodin had overturned both the city-focus and the political 
component of citizenship that were central to the ancient understanding. One 
of his aims in redefining the term had been precisely to shift the loyalties of 
the inhabitants of France from the local to the national.  Bodin was able to do 16
this because he drained citizenship of its political content. It is true that on 
                                                                       
Bodin’s  account  the  term  ‘citoyen’  was  used  to  describe  the  head  of  the 
household when he left his house and domestic affairs to enter the city and to 
engage in public affairs.  However, the nature of that engagement was limit17 -
ed. Bodin explicitly challenged Aristotle’s definition of a citizen as ‘one who is 
a magistrate or who exercises a deliberative voice in the assemblies of the 
people, whether in matters of judgement or affairs of the state'.  Instead he 18
defined a citizen as 'a free subject under the sovereignty of another' and in-
sisted that citizenship involved the mutual obligation between subject  and 
sovereign – the obedience of the one in exchange for the protection of the oth-
er: ‘every citizen is subject in the sense that a small part of his liberty is dimin-
ished by the majesty of him to whom he owes obedience, but all subjects are 
not citizens.’  19
   According to Rousseau, this apolitical, Bodinian conception of citizenship, 
which had been dominant during the seventeenth century, remained all too 
prevalent in eighteenth-century France. In Du Contrat social he reasserted the 
ancient political conception of the term against the Bodinian alternative:
The true sense of this word [City] is almost entirely effaced among the 
moderns;  most take a city for a City,  and a bourgeois for a Citizen. 
They do not know that houses make the city but Citizens make the 
City. This same error once cost the Carthaginians dear. I have not read 
                                                                       
that the subjects of any Prince were ever given the title Cives, not even 
the  Macedonians  in  ancient  times  nor,  in  our  days,  the  English,  al-
though they are closer to freedom than all the others. Only the French 
assume the name Citizen casually, because they have no genuine idea 
of  it,  as  can be  seen in  their  Dictionaries;  otherwise  they would be 
committing  the  crime  of  Lese-Majesté  in  usurping  it:  for  them  this 
name expresses a virtue and not a right. When Bodin wanted to speak 
of our Citizens and Bourgeois, he committed a bad blunder in taking 
the one for the other. M. d’Alembert made no mistake about it, and in 
his  article  Geneva  he  correctly  distinguished the four  orders  of  men 
(even five, if simple foreigners are included) there are in our city, and 
only two of which make up the Republic. No other French author has, 
to my knowledge, understood the true meaning of the word Citizen.20
   Yet, even after the publication of Du Contrat social, the Bodinian concept re-
mained popular – especially among those involved in governing France. As 
Louis XV made clear in 1766, in his response to attempts by the Parlements to 
exercise a role in legislation as representatives of the nation, sovereign power 
resided ultimately in him:
It is in my person alone that sovereign power resides … it is from me 
alone that my courts hold their existence and their authority … public 
                                                                       
order in its entirety emanates from me, and my people forms one with 
me, and the rights and interests of the nation, of which people are dar-
ing to make a body separate from the monarch, are necessarily united 
with mine and repose only in my hands.21
In the course of the next decade or so, the prevailing attitude would be com-
pletely transformed. That transformation was the result of the development of 
a third conception of citizenship.
Rights-Based Citizenship
As the label suggests, according to the rights-based conception of citizenship 
citizens  were  defined  as  the  possessors  of  certain  rights.  This  conception 
shared something in common with the Bodinian version in that it too made it 
possible to conceive of citizens of a nation rather than just a city-state, and it 
did not necessarily require citizens to engage in political participation. How-
ever, the way in which this concept developed in the eighteenth century often 
did involve a political component, and it can thus also be viewed as an at-
tempt to make the ancient conception of  citizenship workable in the large 
states of the modern world.
   Diderot enunciated the rights-based conception of citizenship in his Ency-
clopédie article ‘Citoyen’, in a way that brought out some of the ambiguities 
                                                                       
inherent in the concept. Though he made reference to citizenship in the an-
cient world – and even cited Aristotle’s definition – Diderot also accepted that 
the word had a contemporary meaning, referring to being a member of a na-
tion and all this entailed, and he did not question the idea of citizenship on a 
national scale. His initial definition of the term centred on the idea of the pos-
session of certain rights and freedoms:
A citizen is someone who is a member of a free society with many fam-
ilies,  who shares in the rights of this society,  and  who benefits from 
these freedoms … Someone who has been divested of these rights and 
freedoms has stopped being a citizen. One accords the title to women, 
young children, and servants, only as family members of a citizen, …, 
but they are not truly citizens.22
However, Diderot made no explicit mention of political rights and he went on 
to insist that Aristotle’s strict political definition of the term was only applica-
ble in pure democracies.
   This idea that citizenship could involve the possession of civil, but not polit-
ical rights, survived into the Revolution, and was even enacted by the Na-
tional Assembly. According to a law passed in December 1789, men who were 
either under the age of 25 or who paid less than 3 livres a year in tax were to 
                                                                       
be labelled passive citizens. While they were to be entitled to the civil rights 
that had been set out in the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen they 
were not entitled to the political rights of voting in elections, nor were they 
eligible for political office. These passive citizens were distinguished from ac-
tive citizens who did enjoy political rights. The origins of the revolutionary 
notion of active citizenship lay in the development, during the course of the 
eighteenth century, of a version of rights-based citizenship that emphasised 
political participation.
Reviving the Political Dimension of Citizenship
From the early seventeenth century, France was an absolute monarchy, the Es-
tates-General (the traditional means of national collective deliberation) was 
not called at all between 1614 and 1788, and most of those outside the French 
court had no political role. However, as recent authors have noted neither po-
litical deliberation and collective decision making, nor elections and voting, 
were completely unknown in France during this period, at least for particular 
groups in certain areas.  In addition, during the course of the century, various 23
political thinkers explored ideas and put forward practical proposals for ex-
tending the right to political participation much more widely.
   Arguments for increasing political participation were most commonly asso-
ciated with appeals back to an ancient French constitution and with calls for 
                                                                       
the resurrection of the Estates-General.  Though originally developed by six24 -
teenth-century Huguenot resistance theorists such as François Hotman, the 
eighteenth-century version of ancient constitutionalism owed much to Henri 
de Boulainvilliers, and other advocates of the thèse nobiliaire, who wrote in the 
final years and immediate aftermath of Louis XIV’s reign. 
   Boulainvilliers sought to demonstrate that the Franks, who had conquered 
Gaul at the time of the collapse of the Roman Empire, had been a free and 
equal warrior people who had chosen their kings and shared in rule with 
them.  The system had been corrupted over time, but was restored under 25
Charlemagne.  Through  this  historical  analysis,  Boulainvilliers  sought  to 
demonstrate that absolutism had been a later innovation within the French 
polity. On this basis he argued that the nobility ought to reclaim their tradi-
tional role within government and he argued for the restoration of the assem-
blies of the nation.
   Though it was viewed as radical and dangerous at the time, Boulainvilliers’s 
theory  remained  wedded  to  the  aristocratic  and  corporatist  conception  of 
French society that prevailed in the late medieval and early modern periods. 
His ‘citizens’ were also nobles, and they were entitled to participate in politics 
not on the grounds of natural rights, but rather because of the privileges at-
tached to their status. It was only in the mid-eighteenth century, in the works 
                                                                       
of writers like Gabriel Bonnot de Mably and Guillaume-Joseph Saige, that ap-
peals to an ancient constitution, and calls for the revival of the Estates-Gener-
al, were yoked to a notion of natural rights and applied to the nation as a 
whole. 
   Historical examples, and the theoretical arguments of Boulainvilliers, were 
not the only models on which those wanting to revive the political component 
of French citizenship could draw. There also existed a relevant eighteenth-cen-
tury example. According to contemporary accounts, the form of government 
that had been imposed by the Franks in Gaul was very similar to that which 
had been established by the Saxons across the Channel in England. However, 
whereas in France it had been undermined by absolutism, in England it had 
evolved gradually into the parliamentary system. Though the English model 
had itself been threatened by absolutism in the seventeenth century, new life 
had been breathed into it by the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89.  As Mon26 -
tesquieu put it in De L’Esprit des lois: ‘If one wants to read the admirable work 
by Tacitus, On the Mores of the Germans, one will see that the English have tak-
en their idea of political government from the Germans. This fine system was 
found in the forests.’27
   Mably was well aware of the British model and drew on it directly in his 
significantly named Des Droits et des devoirs du citoyen.  This work takes the 28
                                                                       
form of a series of letters recalling conversations between their French author 
and an Englishman called Milord Stanhope, who is the embodiment of an 
eighteenth-century  British  commonwealthman.  In  the  first  letter,  the 29
Frenchman notes that his ancestors had once enjoyed the same liberties as the 
English, but: ‘Our forefathers sold their liberty, gave it away, or allowed it to 
be destroyed.’  As the work goes on Stanhope gradually convinces his com30 -
panion that the French could imitate and even surpass the English by reviving 
the Estates-General and reclaiming their political rights.  31
   On one level, Mably’s notion of citizenship was very broad. As Stanhope 
explained: ‘Every man, with the exception of those who are insane or crimi-
nal, must be a citizen, when he lives among men who have laws.’  The impli32 -
cation was that in the absence of a formal political role, the rights and duties 
of the citizen consisted in watching over the government and taking action if 
it appeared to be operating contrary to the public interest. However, Mably 
also argued that part of France’s problem was the lack of formal political en-
gagement by the citizen body. In the course of the work he thus elaborated a 
richer sense of the political component of citizenship.
   Mably’s ideal form of government was a communal republic similar to that 
of ancient Sparta. He accepted, however, that such a system was not workable 
in a large, modern, nation such as Britain or France. Consequently, his aim in 
                                                                       
Des Droits et des devoirs du citoyen was to sketch out the best system of gov-
ernment that could be accommodated to those circumstances – and to de-
scribe the various stages of  the ‘révolution ménagée’  by which the French 
might attain it.  He argued that the Paris Parlement ought to use the opportu33 -
nity presented by one of its, now common, conflicts with the court to spark 
the reform process by calling for the convocation of the Estates-General.
   Mably believed that sovereign power originated with the people and his re-
form proposals were aimed at returning it to them.  This, he claimed, would 34
ensure that the laws were wise and that they operated in the public interest.  35
He thus counselled that once the Estates-General had been revived it ought to 
seize  legislative  power  for  itself.  While,  unlike  Rousseau,  Mably  had no 36
problem with the use of representatives to exercise legislative power on behalf 
of the people, he was concerned that in practice the executive might override 
the decisions of the legislature.  The solution to this problem was to hold 37
regular meetings of both the national and provincial assemblies:
These general assemblies should meet at least once every three years, 
but [in addition] each province should have its own Estates that should 
meet annually and, if possible, at different times, so that the executive 
power is constantly under the surveillance of a powerful body that is 
ready, if need be, to sound the alarm.38
                                                                       
   Mably wrote Des Droits et des devoirs du citoyen  before the publication of 
Rousseau’s Du Contrat social in 1762. Just over a decade later, Saige produced 
his  Catéchisme du citoyen  in which he effectively amalgamated the political 
theory of Rousseau with the historical arguments found in Mably’s work.  39
Written in the aftermath of Chancellor Maupeou’s coup, which was widely 
seen as symbolising the despotic nature of Louis XV’s government, Saige’s 
work took the form of a political catechism on ‘le Droit Public Français’. Saige 
adopted Rousseau’s distinction between sovereignty and government and in-
sisted that the former must reside in the body of the people.  By contrast with 40
Rousseau in Du Contrat social, however, Saige insisted that popular sovereign-
ty was workable in a large, nation state.  41
   In fact, Rousseau had acknowledged this himself just a couple of years earli-
er. In 1772 he published his Considérations sur le gouvernement de Pologne, in 
which he applied the theory set out in Du Contrat social to that nation.  In this 42
work, he explained how measures such as a federal structure and a system of 
binding mandates might be used to render popular sovereignty a reality even 
in a large, modern state such as Poland. 
   This was precisely the solution that Saige adopted for France. In Chapter 
Nine of Catéchisme du citoyen, he described the commons or Third Estate as 
                                                                       
being divided into a number of communes or little republics.  The citizens of 43
each commune would gather together to legislate for their own community, to 
choose magistrates to exercise executive power within that community, and to 
elect  deputies  to  represent  them  in  the  Estates-General.  Moreover,  like 
Rousseau,  Saige  also  insisted that  those  deputies  should be  bound by the 
views of their constituents.44
   Just like Mably, Saige supported his claims not only with theoretical reason-
ing, but also with evidence drawn from French history: ‘we learn [from Taci-
tus] that among the [Frankish] nations, legislative power lay in the body of 
the citizens, that their leaders only had the right to propose laws in the public 
assemblies and to execute those that had already been made’.  This system, 45
Saige acknowledged, had been corrupted over time as the Frankish kings and 
nobles had usurped the rights of the commons, but Charlemagne had restored 
the assemblies to their original form.  It was at this point that the extent of 46
the population and territory had necessitated the introduction of representa-
tion:
It was difficult, if not impossible, for all to gather together in the general 
council.  Consequently, he established that each county or district of the 
monarchy would elect a certain number of deputies who would represent 
it and vote for it in the assembly of the Champ-de-Mai.47
                                                                       
Later on the Estates-General had taken over the role of these assemblies, and 
it was this body that Saige wanted to see revived in his own time.
   While, unlike Mably, Saige did not explicitly draw the English parallel in his 
work, there is evidence to suggest that he may have recognised it. Keith Baker 
claims that his use of the term ‘commons’ as a synonym for the Third Estate 
implied a parallel with the English House of Commons.  More explicit evi48 -
dence exists in the correspondence of the historian Catharine Macaulay. In 
1785, Saige proposed Macaulay as a corresponding member of the Musée de 
Bordeaux, a local philosophical society to which he belonged.  In a letter that 49
he wrote to her on 14 September of that year, to accompany her certificate of 
membership, he noted that the citizens of England were better off than those 
in France, in that they enjoyed both civil liberty and a larger portion of politi-
cal liberty.   Along with his letter, Saige also sent Macaulay a copy of the sec50 -
ond edition of his Catéchisme du citoyen, which he was about to publish.51
   It was not only advocates of the idea of the ancient constitution who were 
looking to extend political participation in France during the second half of 
the eighteenth century. Several figures associated with the physiocrats wrote 
treatises that proposed ways of expanding political participation while retain-
ing the power and prestige of the monarchy.  These included the Marquis de 52
                                                                       
Mirabeau's Mémoire concernant l'utilité des États provinciaux (1750) and Anne-
Robert-Jacques Turgot's  Mémoire  sur les  municipalités.  The latter,  which was 
written by Turgot's secretary Pierre-Samuel Dupont de Nemours, called for 
the establishment of a hierarchy of new consultative assemblies, which would 
furnish the state with the crucial information it needed in order to govern ef-
fectively and would link representation directly to taxation as a means of si-
multaneously  opening up political  discussion  and providing  a  solution  to 
France's growing financial crisis. Turgot was also particularly  concerned to 
use this new system to provide a form of political education - or citizenship 
training - for France's inhabitants:
The primary means of connection within nations is mores; the 
foundation of mores is instruction from childhood on all the duties of 
man in society. It is surprising that this science is so little developed. 
There are methods and institutions to educate mathematicians, doctors, 
painters, but none for educating citizens! We could have such methods 
and institutions, if national instruction was directed by one of your 
councils, offering political views according to uniform principles ... and 
the study of the duties of the citizen, as a member of a family and of 
the state, would be the foundation of all other studies, which would be 
prioritised according to their usefulness to society.53
                                                                       
Unfortunately, Turgot was dismissed from office before he was able to submit 
his memorandum to the King, but his successors Jacques Necker and Charles 
Alexandre de Calonne also looked to  provincial  assemblies  as  a  means of 
solving  the  nation's  problems,  and  put  forward  similar  proposals  of  their 
own, and some practical reforms were implemented in the period between 
1778 and 1787.54
   Thus, the late 1780s saw the appearance of a whole host of proposals for the 
extension of political participation in France, ranging from Calonne's edict on 
local government reform (1787) to Mably’s Des Droits et des devoirs du citoyen 
which, though written much earlier, was only published for the first time in 
1789. It is, therefore, not surprising that the ideas concerning citizenship de-
veloped in these works found echoes during the Revolution.
Citizenship and the French Revolution
It was no coincidence that one of the first acts of the newly formed National 
Assembly was to draw up and proclaim the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et 
du citoyen.  While the outbreak of the Revolution followed with uncanny ac55 -
curacy the proposals for a ‘révolution ménagée’ outlined by Mably, the way in 
which citizenship was conceived by leading revolutionaries was more in line 
with Saige in its amalgamation of Rousseauian and traditional French prac-
tices. However, some revolutionaries took these ideas a step further by devel-
                                                                       
oping the notion that each of the deputies of the Third Estate represented the 
nation as a whole, not just their own constituents.
   In his pamphlet Vues sur les moyens d'exécution dont les représentans de la 
France pourront disposer en 1789 Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès began by defining 
citizenship in distinctly Rousseauian terms:
In general, any citizen deprived of the right to consult his own inter-
ests, to deliberate, and to impose laws upon himself is rightly taken to 
be a serf. It follows that the right to consult its own interests, to delib-
erate, and to impose laws upon itself must necessarily belong to the 
nation.56
Sieyès  was concerned with a  nation rather  than a  city-state  and was well 
aware of the problems involved in instituting this notion of citizenship in a 
large state: ‘As the number of citizens increases it becomes difficult or impos-
sible for them to assemble to hear each individual will and then reconcile their 
differences to form a general will.’  To solve the problem Sieyès, like Saige, 57
began by proposing that the nation be divided into smaller units. As he ex-
plained: ‘Since the totality of citizens either cannot, or will not, assemble to-
gether in a single place, the totality has to be divided into districts and each 
                                                                       
district has, by agreement, to nominate a proportional number of deputies.’  58
Unlike Saige, however, Sieyès firmly rejected the idea of binding mandates: 
it soon becomes clear that delegating a number of simple vote carriers 
is essentially vicious, because those selected as deputies, obliged to ad-
here scrupulously to the commission of those who mandated them, of-
ten find themselves unable to agree, making it impossible to extract a 
common will from the totality of votes….
All this leads the community to give its mandatories more confidence. 
It gives them a proxy enabling them to meet, to deliberate, to reconcile 
their views, and to come to a common will, so that it now has genuine 
representatives instead of simple vote carriers.59
Thus Sieyès ended up dismissing Rousseau’s hostility to representation, em-
bracing it as the means of making the political aspect of citizenship workable 
in a large nation such as France.
   As a leading revolutionary, Sieyès was in a position to turn his ideas into re-
ality. Soon after he wrote Vues sur les moyens the elections to the Estates-Gen-
eral were held and France’s inhabitants were given the opportunity to engage 
in political participation for the first time in a hundred and seventy-five years. 
                                                                       
However, despite the significance of the revival of the Estates-General it still 
embodied the old-fashioned corporatist conception of the French realm and 
the idea of deputies as delegates rather than representatives.  The pamphlets 
that Sieyès published in early 1789 did much to counter these views. Both 
they and their author played a role in bringing about the establishment of the 
National Assembly on 17 June 1789, which transformed the practice of citi-
zenship in France into something that was both national and political.  60
   Not surprisingly, the implementation of a rights-based conception of citi-
zenship in France raised a new set of problems. In particular, there was the 
question of who was to be included in, and excluded from, citizenship – and 
on what grounds. At the same time, the emphasis on the political component 
of citizenship raised the practical problem of how political participation could 
be rendered both meaningful and workable in the context of a large nation 
state. 
Citizens and Non-Citizens
Citizenship had always been an exclusive category. Citizens were defined in 
relation to those who were not citizens and even in the ancient world only a 
small minority of the inhabitants of a city-state were granted citizen status. 
This was related to the view of citizenship as a privilege. Aristotle, for exam-
ple, had spoken in terms of the ‘special characteristic’ that distinguished citi-
                                                                       
zens from other inhabitants of the state. In presenting citizenship as a right, 
rather than a privilege, the revolutionaries brought into question the grounds 
on which certain inhabitants could be excluded from it.
   The elections to the Estates-General had involved a relatively wide fran-
chise, by the standards of the day. Attendance at the Primary Assemblies for 
the election of deputies of the Third Estate was restricted to men over the age 
of 25, who were French (or had been naturalised) who lived locally and were 
listed in the tax rolls.  The property qualification was upped slightly in De61 -
cember 1789 when the distinction between active and passive citizens was in-
troduced and when further restrictions (including the marc d'argent property 
qualification) were placed on who could become a deputy in the National As-
sembly. This limited the enfranchised population to a figure of 4,300,000 out 
of a total population of 25-26,000,000.  Suffrage was exercised in an indirect 62
manner, with the primary assemblies choosing representatives for the elec-
toral assembly of the district, who would then choose the representatives of 
the Legislative Assembly. Under the Constitution of 1791 the property qualifi-
cation was increased further, but the marc d’argent qualification for deputies 
was dropped.
   One of the few deputies to express unease at the proposed divisions within 
the citizen body was Maximilien Robespierre. In a speech given to the Na-
                                                                       
tional Assembly on 22 October 1789, he protested the new ‘conditions of eligi-
bility’ that were being proposed. Citing the Déclaration des droits and its asser-
tion of an end to privileges, distinctions and exceptions, he insisted that: ‘All 
citizens, whoever they are, have the right to aspire to all levels of office-hold-
ing.’ He went on:
The Constitution establishes that sovereignty resides in the people, in 
all  the  individuals  of  the  people.  Each  individual  therefore  has  the 
right to participate in making the law which governs him and in the 
administration of the public good which is his own. If not, it is not true 
that all men are equal in rights, that every man is a citizen.  63
   Though Robespierre was ignored at the time, his view eventually prevailed. 
The distinction between active and passive citizens was abolished on 11 Au-
gust 1792. The elections to the National Convention that followed were con-
ducted on the basis of the most extensive franchise ever. To vote in those elec-
tions one had to be male, over the age of 21, resident in France for at least a 
year, in work or living off a private income and not a servant. The franchise 
adopted in the Constitution of 1793 was similarly extensive. Had its imple-
mentation not been interrupted by the adoption of ‘Revolutionary Govern-
ment’ it would have imposed universal manhood suffrage for all over the age 
of 21 who had been born and lived in France, as well as to foreigners who ful-
                                                                       
filled certain conditions. Moreover, according to this Constitution not only did 
all  citizens have the right to attend their  local  primary assembly,  but they 
were  also  eligible  for  higher  office.  Even so,  the  notion  of  citizenship  en-
shrined in the final version of the Constitution of 1793 did not go as far as 
some had wanted. Condorcet, in the draft he produced in February 1793, pro-
posed that citizens should elect deputies and administrators directly, and that 
all constitutional laws should be subject to a popular vote.64
   The emphasis on rights-based citizenship not only prompted a questioning 
of the property qualification, but also led to challenges on behalf of other ex-
cluded groups. Protestants were granted full citizenship on 24 December 1789 
and Sephardic Jews followed on 28 January 1790, though other Jewish groups 
had to wait until September 1791.65
   The question of female citizenship was also raised. The Journal de la Société de 
1789 for July 1790 included an article by the marquis de Condorcet entitled 
‘Sur l’Admission des femmes au droit  de cité’.  Condorcet insisted that the 
revolutionaries had violated their own principles in establishing the common 
rights of men, without also according those rights to women.  In order to jus66 -
tify their exclusion, Condorcet insisted, it was necessary to prove either that 
the rights of women were not the same as those of men, or that women were 
not capable of exercising them. He went on to argue that both these premises 
                                                                       
were false. The rights of men, he insisted, were based simply on their status as 
‘rational and sentient beings, susceptible of acquiring ideas of morality, and of 
thinking about  those  ideas’  and,  since  women possessed exactly  the  same 
qualities,  they therefore  had the  same rights.  The  argument  that  women 67
were incapable of exercising the rights of citizenship was also difficult to sus-
tain unless a large proportion of the male population was also excluded from 
citizenship. Condorcet then refuted in turn each of the common arguments 
against assigning women political rights. 
   A year after Condorcet’s article had appeared, Olympe de Gouges also put 
the case for female enfranchisement. Her Les Droits de la femme  echoed the 
format and language of the Déclaration of 1789,  but corrected it  by adding 
women  to  the  picture.  In  line  with  the  official  Déclaration  she  declared 68
women to be born free and to be equal in rights to men. She then went on to 
accord them not just the civil, but also the political rights granted to men in 
the Declaration (Article 6). Elsewhere she highlighted the huge inequalities in 
the treatment of women: they could mount the scaffold, but not the rostrum 
(Article 10); they were expected to pay equal taxes, but did not have a right to 
hold political office (Article 13). Moreover, she added to Article 16 by stating: 
‘the constitution is null if the majority of individuals who compose the nation 
have not cooperated in drafting it’.  69
                                                                       
   Both De Gouges and Condorcet also expressed concern about another group 
that  was  initially  excluded from French citizenship.  In  her  Déclaration,  De 
Gouges drew a parallel between the treatment of women and that of slaves in 
the French colonies, and both she and Condorcet campaigned for the abolition 
of slavery.  Not surprisingly, the emphasis placed by the revolutionaries on 70
the rights of man prompted a debate over this issue and led various colonial 
groups, including slaves, to voice their own claims for citizenship rights.  A 71
number  of  key  figures,  including  Condorcet  and  his  friend  Jacques-Pierre 
Brissot,  were already concerned about the incompatibility between slavery 
and Enlightenment values before the outbreak of the Revolution. The Société 
des amis des noirs was founded by Brissot in 1788 and slavery also figured in a 
number of the cahiers sent to the Estates-General, perhaps prompted by an es-
say by Condorcet on the subject that was sent out to electoral districts.  How72 -
ever, it was the arrival in Paris of a delegation of seventeen colonists from 
Saint-Domingue  demanding  admission  to  the  Constituent  Assembly  that 
brought the issue of slavery (and the complex question of the rights of Saint-
Domingue’s  various  social  groups)  to  the  forefront  of  revolutionary 
concerns.  When nine of the delegates participated in the Tennis Court Oath, 73
their right to representation was accepted in principle, but disagreement en-
sued over how many deputies the colony was entitled to send and this raised 
the controversial issue of whether the delegates represented just the white in-
habitants of the island or the blacks as well.  74
                                                                       
   The issue became more complicated on 22 October, when a delegation of 
free men of colour arrived at the Constituent Assembly. Inspired by the de-
bates taking place, they insisted that they too should be represented, a de-
mand that was endorsed by the Amis des noirs. This group raised a difficult 
issue for the Assembly, since many of them owned property and so could not 
be excluded from citizenship on the usual grounds of ‘dependence’.  Legisla75 -
tion was eventually drawn up in March 1790, but its vagueness on the crucial 
question of whether free men of colour were to be included among the ranks 
of active citizens prompted an open debate on the question. By the autumn, 
the Constituent Assembly was seeking to avoid the issue, decreeing on 12 Oc-
tober that it was up to the colonial assemblies to request clear legislation on 
the status of persons within the colonies.  Vacillation continued throughout 
1791, but on 4 April 1792, under the new Girondin Ministry, the Legislative 
Assembly declared equality of political rights for all men of colour and free 
blacks.  76
   The slave revolt in Saint-Domingue brought further concessions. On 21 June 
1793 Léger Félicité Sonthonax promised the insurgent slaves their liberty and 
citizenship if they would fight for the republican army, and on 29 August he 
declared the end of slavery in the northern province. Following this on 23 
September elections were held in which white, mixed race and black deputies 
                                                                       
were chosen.  The appearance of these deputies at the National Convention 77
prompted the abolition of slavery in all French colonies on 4 February 1794. 
Significantly, slaves were not simply granted their liberty, but were also im-
mediately to enjoy all the rights associated with French citizenship.   78
  One might imagine that the rise of colonialism may have contributed to-
wards the enfranchisement of the lower orders in France by creating a new 
underclass – ensuring that the crucial distinction within society was no longer 
between different orders, but between citizens and slaves.  Plausible as this 79
may seem, it does not fit the French case well since for the most part those 
who were in favour of extending political participation were also advocates of 
the abolition of slavery. However, there is evidence of this kind of logic oper-
ating  in  Saint-Domingue  itself.  In  the  elections  held  in  February  1790  all 
blacks, including those who owned property, were excluded from the fran-
chise. However, votes were granted to all whites who had lived in the colony 
for at least a year, a far more extensive suffrage than that enjoyed in France at 
the time. Laurent Dubois has suggestively described this as ‘democratization 
based on racism’.80
Political Participation in a Large Modern State
The other problem generated by the adoption of the rights-based conception 
of citizenship was how political participation could be made both meaningful 
                                                                       
and workable in the context of a large nation state. Not all revolutionaries 
were as comfortable as Sieyès about embracing representative government. 
For example, members of the Cordeliers Club recognised that adopting the 
representative system involved diluting the political content of citizenship to 
the extent that it no longer fulfilled what was, for them, its essential function 
(of allowing the citizen body direct involvement in the legislative process).  81
Thus, while acknowledging that some element of representation was essential 
in a large state such as France, the Cordeliers sought means by which the ac-
tions and decisions of the representatives (or delegates as they preferred to 
call  them)  could  be  placed  under  the  control  of  the  people.  Following 
Rousseau, they called for binding mandates, but in addition they also advo-
cated the popular ratification of laws.82
   As early as 1790, one of the leading members of the Club, Pierre-François 
Robert, put forward the idea of the popular ratification of laws in his pam-
phlet Républicanisme adapté à la France.  Responding to the objection that the 
French nation was too large for such a system to work, Robert argued that 
with the division of France into departments, districts, cantons, municipalities 
and sections, it would be no more difficult to assemble people for the purpose 
of sanctioning laws than it was to assemble them to name their representa-
tives.83
                                                                       
   The most detailed version of this proposal was Réné Girardin’s Discours sur 
la nécessité de la ratification de la loi, par la volonté générale, which was delivered 
to the Club on 7 June 1791. Girardin presented the popular ratification of laws 
as necessary to the fulfilment of the Déclaration des droits:
In order for the law really to be the practical expression [of the general 
will], it is necessary that all the citizens can take part in its formation, 
following their inalienable right and solemnly proclaimed by article 6 
of the declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen.
This precious right is, both the essence, and the very existence of sov-
ereignty; the nation cannot therefore lose it, nor delegate it, without re-
linquishing its sovereignty too.
The necessity of the ratification of the laws by the general will is, there-
fore, such a crucial point that it is precisely, gentlemen … that it is abso-
lutely the ça ira of the declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen.84
In the second half of his speech Girardin demonstrated the means by which 
the popular ratification of laws might be rendered workable in France. The 
Cordeliers were so impressed that they called for the printing and distribution 
of the speech, and the published version includes their endorsement of Gi-
                                                                       
rardin’s proposal.  Of course, as with the idea of creating female citizens, this 85
proposal was never considered by the National Assembly. Nonetheless, it is a 
measure of how far France had come since the reign of Louis XIV that such 
proposals were being publicly discussed in 1791.
The Post-Jacobin Reaction
The transformation of theoretical understandings of French citizenship had 
effectively been enacted by the mid-1790s, but subsequently the practice of 
citizenship narrowed again. The Constitution of 1795 constituted a retrograde 
step, with the reintroduction of a property qualification. The drift continued 
under Napoleon, with citizenship remaining relatively extensive in theory but 
becoming much more limited in practice. The Constitution of 1800 introduced 
a system of adult male suffrage, with just a one-year residence qualification, 
and the Civil Code of 1804 clearly set out the rights and duties of citizens on a 
whole host of matters, and embodied both equality before the law and careers 
open to talent. However, in practice, the extent of popular participation was 
compromised by a system of indirect elections and electoral lists, and fresh 
elections  were  not  held  for  over  a  year.  Even  the  seemingly  democratic 86
plebiscite used to ratify the new Constitution was fundamentally flawed.  In 87
the judicial  sphere,  too,  Bonaparte  imposed his  centralising and top-down 
approach to governance – removing almost completely the practice of electing 
local officials.  Moreover in the case of women, the effect of the Civil Code 88
                                                                       
was to reduce their legal rights and increase patriarchal power over them – 
particularly with regard to divorce.  Bonaparte was also responsible for the 89
reintroduction of slavery in the French colonies with his decree of 20 March 
1803.
Conclusion
It is clear that France during the early-modern period witnessed the devel-
opment of, and competition between, several distinct conceptions of citizen-
ship. The ancient concept, which had direct political participation at its heart, 
continued to be an important reference point. However, its political element 
was diminished in various ways and the much more restrictive Bodinian con-
ception was dominant for much of the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth 
century, as a result of appeals to the older notion and to the idea of France's 
'ancient  constitution',  the  modern  rights-based  concept  of  citizenship 
emerged. It eventually prevailed and remained dominant into the nineteenth 
century,  though its  application fluctuated,  and it  would be almost  another 
hundred years before female suffrage would be established.90
   The French Revolution may indeed have been the first experiment with 
democracy, as François Furet has argued,  as well as being the first time that 91
something resembling our modern notion of citizenship was put into practice, 
but  it  seems clear  that  those experiments  and practices  (together  with the 
                                                                       
problems they engendered) were grounded in a new understanding of citi-
zenship that had developed gradually over the course of the previous century. 
Nor were the new ideas and practices universally accepted or permanently 
adopted  during  the  1790s.  The  Revolution  certainly  marked an  important 
stage  in  their  development,  but  our  modern  concepts  of  citizenship  and 
democracy went through a long and complex process of gestation.
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